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War as Business in South Korea’s Manchurian Action Films
Jinsoo An
Toward a Typology of South Korea’s Korean War Films
From the 1950s to the present, more than ninety South Korean films, both 
narrative and documentary, have dealt with the subject of the Korean War, 
treating the conflict as a historical calamity that left a profound impact on 
the subsequent development of both Koreas. Yet, as an unending war, the 
Korean War hardly marks a closed historical chapter, as many of these films 
imply; rather, the war is at the foundation of continuing tensions on the 
Korean peninsula where Cold War politics continue to structure the reality 
of people both north and south of the 38th parallel. Since the formation of 
North and South Korea as inimical states, both sides have witnessed massive 
ideological campaigns. Within this ideologically driven context, cinema has 
performed an effective cultural function by disseminating state ideology to 
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the masses. As I explore in this essay, however, the ideological configuration 
of South Korea’s Korean War films has generated a spectrum of nuances 
and implications, at times unsettling, rather than congealing, their meaning.
In seizing the scenario of war, South Korea’s Korean War cinema has, 
to no small degree, sought to solidify a negative image of the enemy other. 
As Theodore Hughes notes, North Korea, over time, has been increasingly 
marked by and associated with decline, collapse, and demise in the cultural 
imaginary of South Korea. In contrast, South Korea has been rendered in 
overtly visible terms, both present and alive.1 Through this discursive pro-
cess in which South Korea is implicitly set against a negative reflection of 
the counter- regime to its north, the South Korean state, within war narra-
tive films, is represented as the sole rightful Korean nation. Revealing little 
about South Korea’s positive substance but a great deal about its anxiet-
ies about legitimacy and security, South Korea’s Korean War films have 
rendered visible and tangible the various scenarios of struggle against the 
anticommunism that the state has maintained as an immutable political 
raison d’être.2
That cinema functions as the state ideological apparatus is, of course, 
not a new claim. Moreover, given that North Korea and South Korea went 
to war with each other to realize rival political visions of a single unified 
Korean nation, it is hardly surprising that both governments have tightly 
patrolled the ideological boundaries of their respective bodies of Korean 
War films. For example, the repressive censorship controversies surrounding 
the release of P’iagol (Yi Kang- ch’ŏn, 1955) and the confiscation of the film 
prints of Seven Female Prisoners (Yi Man- hŭi, 1965) indicate the draconic 
measures that the South Korean state imposed on the construction of the 
North Korean enemy and North Korea’s political ideology on the screen.3 
Yet, in seeking to affirm South Korea’s political and moral superiority over 
North Korea, South Korea’s Korean War films have revealingly, for the 
most part, sidestepped the issue of origins so central to claims of political 
legitimacy.
This essay brings into view the interpretive parameters of South Korea’s 
cinema of the Korean War, and in so doing, endeavors to read the war 
beyond the limits of its received cinematic framings. In this essay, I pay 
attention to the conceptual boundaries of Korean War narrative and imag-
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ery, and I examine how these limits are closely related to the continuing iter-
ation of anticommunist state ideology in South Korean films. South Korea’s 
1960s filmmaking scene is of particular interest here because this period 
ushered in various types of war narratives on the screen. Certainly, anti-
communist Korean War films were a dominant type of war cinema — their 
production dating back to the early days of the Korean War conflict. The 
South Korean government mobilized film personnel and resources to pro-
duce documentary and newsreel films about the nature of the Korean War 
to inculcate the masses then under the hardship of total war.4 In the 1960s, 
the collaboration between the state and filmmakers reached a zenith, as 
the state provided a complex form of institutional support for the produc-
tion of anticommunist Korean War films. At the same time, the success 
of Yi Man- hŭi’s The Marines Who Never Return (Toraoji annŭn haebyŏng, 
1963) and Shin Sang- ok’s Red Muffler (Ppalgan mahura, 1964) proved the 
commercial viability of the Korean War theme. These works were followed 
by a slew of Korean War or war- themed films, such as The Inchon Land-
ing (Inch’ŏn sangryuk chakchŏn, Cho Kŭng- ha, 1965), Bloody Kuwol Moun-
tains (P’iŏrin kuwolsan, Ch’oe Mu- ryong, 1965), War and the Woman Teacher 
(Chŏnjaenggwa yŏ’gyosa, Im Kwon- taek, 1966), A Journey (Yŏro, Yi Man- hŭi, 
1968), and Seven People in the Cellar (Chihasilŭi ch’ilin, Yi Sŏng- gu, 1969), 
which largely adhered to the state’s mandate of anticommunism and, in the 
case of Yi Man- hŭi’s films, offered critical humanist perspectives on the 
futility of war. The conspicuous visibility of these films has given rise to an 
impression among film scholars, however, that Korean War films are the 
sole type of war narratives that gained recognition in the 1960s, leaving out 
much- needed discussion on the Cold War as a political structure of war.
The 1960s indeed witnessed the advent of a different type of war nar-
rative film. The so- called Manchurian action films (“Manju action” or 
“Manju Western” in Korean) accrued a popularity that rivaled that of 
government- backed anticommunist Korean War films. Unlike the latter, 
however, Manchurian action films did not receive any institutional support 
from the government. Since they dealt with armed exploits of the colonial 
past, these works were often regarded as a separate film entity, apart from 
the contemporaneous concerns of the Cold War politics that Korean War 
films reflected. As I will illustrate, however, the distinctive critical stance 
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of Manchurian action films affords us an opportunity to engage with the 
formation and naturalization of South Korea’s political discourse of war 
and experience. They register the perverse logic of Cold War politics in a 
way that few explicitly framed “war” films do. Although remote in generic, 
historical, and geographical relation to the Korean War, these films enable 
us to view how state power is consolidated through the state’s involvement 
in perpetual war as an underground business.
South Korean Anticommunism: The Genre and Its Discontents
As a key corpus of the broader genre of South Korean anticommunist films, 
the Korean War film has often been subsidized and carefully regulated 
by the South Korean government. This was most conspicuous in the mid- 
1960s under the Park Chung Hee regime, when “the best anticommunist 
film” and “the best anticommunist screenplay” emerged as new categories in 
South Korea’s prestigious annual Grand Bell Film Awards. This mandate 
of anticommunism within South Korean cinema would turn into an institu-
tionalized creed, instigating the production of anticommunist films, which 
in turn brought material benefits and business incentives to film production 
companies. Making anticommunist films, in other words, was a safe and 
sound business option for the filmmakers of the 1960s.
The close collaboration between the state and film production compa-
nies often yielded to conventional cinematic configurations of the Korean 
War that thematized the collective victimization of all South Koreans, plac-
ing the South Korean state and its people within a shared field of suffer-
ing inflicted by North Korean communists. This body of anticommunist 
Korean War films routinely deployed familiar dramatic tropes and narrative 
trajectories: to wit, South Korea is suddenly exposed to horrific violence 
at the hands of North Korean communist forces who typically appear as 
machinelike ideologues, devoid of human integrity and warmth.5 Such cin-
ematic depictions of their excessive, ruthless devotion to their political creed 
coupled with their belief that they can succeed in politically converting the 
entire population were — it is not difficult to discern — aimed at generating 
a mass dread of communism.
In such anticommunist films, the South Korean camp derives its formal 
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coherence through the operation of negation — South Korea is figured, in 
other words, as that which is outside the political machinery of commu-
nism and its violent implementation. Rather, South Korea is represented as 
a community of innocent bystanders whose social interactions are saturated 
with humanist values and beliefs. At the heart of this binary opposition is 
an a priori distrust of not just revolutionary politics but any politics. Apoliti-
cal and therefore “pure,” the South Korean body politic, as constructed in 
these films, is instead depicted as favoring and valorizing traditional mores 
as the necessary underpinnings of Korean society. South Korea’s Korean 
War films, this is to say, served as a repository of dominant ideology and its 
naturalization.6
South Korea’s war films at once construct and underscore the importance 
of the traditional social fabric of Korea, especially values such as respect for 
the elderly, love for family and neighbor, and so on, which are held to be 
time- honored and sacrosanct. The nation, this is to say, is conceived through 
a model of society in which each member is assigned a proper social role 
and function. Within this restrictive, deeply conservative social imaginary, 
the presence of the military is usually rendered as temporary, a requirement 
for the present that will soon pass. The implication is that South Korean 
society existed as a harmonious and idealized community, born of stable 
human interactions and custom- based social relations that had existed prior 
to the conflict of the Korean War.7 The justification to fight communism, 
given this configuration of values, thus appears to stem from a restora-
tionist impulse. Geared toward reinstating an imagined social order that 
apparently existed from time immemorial on the Korean peninsula, South 
Korean war narratives promote a vision of tradition- based humanism as the 
foundation for the national community.
Depending on how Korean War films articulate the terms of this human-
ism, the international dimensions of the war are either visually pronounced 
but simultaneously muffled or relegated to the margins. The presence of 
foreign forces in these films typically poses no fundamental problem to the 
ethnically homogeneous imaginary of the nation because they are not por-
trayed under the sign of the other but conceived along the lines of affinity 
and depicted as sharing deep human characteristics with South Korean vic-
tims. No film illustrates this theme more explicitly than South Korea’s 1955 
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English- language film Phoenix Hill (Chŏn Ch’ang- gŭn, 1955), in which a 
US soldier and his South Korean counterpart find common ground in the 
cultural ritual of Christmas. This ritual is portrayed as compatible with 
Korean social mores and values — an apparent seamlessness of tradition 
that unites two men from radically different backgrounds. In short, the pre-
sumption of ideological harmony — between the state and its people as well 
as between South Koreans and US citizens — functions as a prerequisite for 
most of South Korea’s Korean War narratives.
Violence culminates in a justification of humanism not only in anti-
communist Korean War films but also in antiwar films. The most notable 
example is the 1955 film P’iagol (Yi Kang- ch’ŏn). Released less than two 
years after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the film represents an 
early cinematic working through of the Korean War, while active coun-
terinsurgency was still being waged against isolated bands of partisans in 
South Korea. Like many of South Korea’s Korean War films, P’iagol offers 
an account of how South Korea fought the civil war, triumphed in battle 
against the communist enemy, and attained popular legitimacy. Unlike 
other Korean War – themed films that typically chronicle the war’s outbreak 
and development, P’iagol presupposes the failure of the communists from 
the outset. On the level of narrative, the film is unmistakably critical of the 
guerrillas’ communist doctrine and practice.
But the film’s insistence on the existential dilemma of the communist 
guerrillas inadvertently generated concern from the South Korean govern-
ment in that it implied psychological complexity of the enemy other. Instead 
of adhering to state prescriptions regarding the war, which required produc-
ers to paint North Korean communists as ruthless ideologues, the film attri-
butes humanity and emotional depth to the several guerrilla characters.8 To 
the censors, this empathetic mode of representing the enemy was ambiguous 
and ideologically risky. Although the filmic narrative could be read as an 
endogenous dissolution of communist ideology, with the abandoned com-
munist cell understood as an allegory for North Korea itself, its depiction 
of the guerrillas exceeded the prescribed political limits of Korean War cin-
ema at the time. Indeed, the film was subjected to a protracted censorship 
battle, which very nearly jeopardized its release. The director and producer 
subsequently gave into political pressure by excising and altering several key 
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sequences to bring the film more closely in line with state propaganda. Yet 
the controversy surrounding the film’s narrative content testifies to consid-
erable lacunae and incongruities within the state’s ideological operations 
during the period when the ideological parameters of Korean War narra-
tives were still being worked through. Indeed, P’iagol signaled the advent 
of antiwar narratives of the Korean War in South Korean film history, a 
small body of films whose indictment of war can be read as a rupture of the 
smooth messaging of the state’s ideological machinery.
Although many critics have valorized P’iagol’s departure from the ideo-
logical narrative template of South Korea’s Korean War films, its firm place 
within the body of films that are classified as “Korean War films” points 
to the conceptual limits of this category. As noted earlier, the Korean War 
looms large over the sociocultural imaginary of war in South Korea, yet as 
a category, “Korean War films” — insofar as they are narrowly focused on 
the war of 1950 – 53 — render the nature of the Cold War largely elusive, if 
not invisible. Here, it should be recalled that the Cold War, as a geopoliti-
cal system, gave rise to a state of war as an ongoing conditioning structure 
of Korea and its neighboring countries. In the service of US hegemony in 
the region, this complex system has organized and regulated sociopolitical, 
economic, security, and cultural relations and operations. In projecting and 
naturalizing a binary worldview that posits the liberal United States and its 
allies against their communist counterparts, the Cold War system has had 
a discursive and logical sway that must be theorized and narrated beyond 
specific instances of military action and engagement.
For this reason, inquiry into Cold War politics in cultural representa-
tion needs to go beyond the confines of Korean War stories, which, as a 
result of the South Korean state’s intense ideological programming, offer 
limited terrain by way of which we can interrogate state power. As a body of 
film whose prescriptive parameters have been closely determined by South 
Korean state intervention, regulation, and scrutiny, South Korea’s Korean 
War films depict military battles and conflicts yet curiously close off the 
larger matrix of perpetual war, which structured the 1950 – 53 instance of 
war in the first place. Instead of expanding the critique of war to compass 
the protracted nature and ubiquity of the state’s military logic and milita-
rized culture, South Korea’s Korean War films, including antiwar films, 
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produce the opposite effect; they paradoxically foreclose critical debates on 
the complexity of war as a structuring imaginary of the Cold War culture 
of South Korea specifically and the region as a whole.
Nihilistic in character, South Korean antiwar films critique war and its 
destruction by highlighting humanistic values. Yet these films are not fun-
damentally different in kind from state- sanctioned, anticommunist war 
films insofar as both promote a pessimistic view toward politics without 
calling into question the structure and practice of the state power in the 
first place. Although differences do exist, these can be understood along 
the lines of an expansion and contraction of narrative focus. Antiwar films 
include a general critique of the state machinery of war. However, this criti-
cal expansion is complemented by an inherently reactive move; instead of 
problematizing the South Korean state’s practice of violence, these films 
revert to the very framework of liberal humanism that anticommunist war 
films have developed as an ideological foil to the ostensible depravity and 
monstrousness of North Korea.
The broadened focus of the antiwar variant of Korean War films, in 
other words, does not lead to critical analysis of the expanded purview of 
South Korean state power and authority enabled by the Korean War, much 
less a reading of it as a sign and symptom of the larger geopolitics of the 
Cold War. Rather, South Korea’s antiwar Korean War films obsessively 
resort to a nihilistic form of humanism, and in so doing, limit the discursive 
parameters of inquiry into the relationship of South Korean state violence to 
the overarching Cold War structure. Enlarged yet paradoxically myopic, the 
focus of these films may compass a universalizing critique of war violence 
in the abstract; yet by disavowing the broader structure of the Cold War, 
Korean War films, classified narrowly as such, remain obscurantist texts. 
Whether anticommunist or antiwar, South Korea’s war films impede critical 
understanding of the Cold War as a permanent system, effacing the Korean 
War’s geopolitical origins and context. More specifically, they block from 
view the business side of South Korea’s military mobilization — a dimen-
sion of the war that has buttressed the South Korean state’s role within the 
coordinates of the Cold War in East Asia.
The impulse to foreclose the war and its meanings from the viewpoint 
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of nihilistic humanism, I thus contend, is constitutive to South Korea’s 
“Korean War films.” Central to the reality of the unending Korean War yet 
effaced from view in South Korea’s ideologically regulated Korean War 
films, the South Korean state seldom, if ever, surfaces as a meaningful object 
of perception. Sovereign in its capacity to dictate representation while simul-
taneously remaining beyond the ambit of representation, South Korean 
state authority thus can be understood as a constitutive ideological limit 
of “Korean War film” as a Cold War cultural text. Hardly passive, South 
Korean state authority wields its power in its demarcation of interpretive 
limits. Thus, to explore Korean War discourse — its rationale, mobilization, 
and logistics — beyond the confines of that body of films conventionally rec-
ognized as “Korean War films,” I contend that its scope must be expanded 
to include cultural scenarios of the 1931 – 45 Pacific War, more specifically, 
the proto- Korean nation- state during the colonial period that waged a mili-
tary campaign against the Japanese empire and its colonial apparatus. By 
directing attention to allegorical representations of the unseemly origins of 
the South Korean state, I aim to challenge how Korean War films can and 
should be understood.
Manchurian Action Film as Korean War Narrative
The structural limitations of Korean War films relative to the perpetual pol-
itics of the Cold War raise the question of whether South Korean war nar-
ratives are capable of directly addressing the state’s Cold War political func-
tion. Even as the argument can be advanced that the South Korean state 
consistently appears in Korean War films as a problematic entity in that it 
is represented as lacking full political authority or initiative, this depiction 
nowhere accords with the historical truth: namely, the South Korean state 
asserted its dreadful power and violence against its own population before, 
during, and after the war. Indeed, the authoritarian state promulgated a 
developmentalist ideology accompanied by massive programming to control 
its populace for decades after the 1950 – 53 war. The inconsistency between 
filmic representation and sociopolitical reality compels us to consider 
whether South Korean cinema is capable of critically reflecting upon the 
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contradictory features of the state as it has functioned within the Cold War 
system. Are there any filmic texts, in other words, that confront the thorny 
matter of the state’s culpability within the “business” of warmongering?
I submit that Manchurian action films of the 1960s and the 1970s furnish 
a critical aperture by way of which the war- profiteering nature of the South 
Korean state can be discerned. To the extent this body of films imagina-
tively reflects upon the colonial past, the historical connection of this body 
of film to the contemporaneous condition of the Cold War — the juncture in 
which they were produced — is far from self- evident. This apparent discon-
nect is compounded by the historiographical constraints of South Korea’s 
Cold War culture, in which the colonial past is often myopically conceived 
as a demarcated window of time that preceded the emergence of the South 
Korean state. I contend, however, that Manchurian action films of the 1960s 
are remarkably reflexive of the capitalist war politics of the Cold War South 
Korean state and in particular shed light on the role of state power in ratio-
nalizing and maintaining the war as a perpetual business. Albeit set in the 
colonial past, these films extend beyond their temporal setting in terms 
of their significance. They demand analysis relative to the Cold War as a 
system. Offering crucial insight into the structural dimensions of the Cold 
War, they assert what most other popular war narratives fail to thematize: 
the workings of the partitioned capitalistic state in authorizing and manag-
ing the prolonged business of war.
Set in Manchuria during the colonial period, Manchurian action films 
are war narratives of a particular kind. As part of a hybrid film cycle that 
gained popularity in 1960s South Korea, these films inherit their nationalist 
ethos from biography films from earlier decades, which glorified the heroic 
anticolonial, independence struggles of Korean patriots. Manchurian action 
films, however, replaced the didacticism of the earlier nationalist films with 
a new narrative approach toward colonial history. Instead of highlighting 
the lives of actual historical figures, these films emphasized the adventures 
of armed militants who waged war against the Japanese imperial army. In 
the late 1960s, these war narrative films incorporated conventions of both 
the Western (hence the hybrid generic term, “Manchurian Western”) and 
martial arts action films, while keeping the masculine ethos of loyalty par-
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ticular to earlier nationalist films intact. A hallmark of Manchurian action 
films, tough masculinity has subsequently cast a long shadow on the action 
film genre as it has developed in South Korea.
I have previously examined this body of films to inquire into the chang-
ing terms of cinematic nationalism during the 1960s.9 Manchurian action 
films can be read as an attempt to reformulate and reenergize anticolonial 
and anti- Japanese nationalism during a period when, in response to the 
pressures of Cold War realpolitik but against the overwhelming opposi-
tion of the South Korean people, the South Korean state normalized rela-
tions with Japan. As texts that engage the colonial period not only within 
a postcolonial juncture in which anti- Japanese sentiment was at a high but 
also in a moment in which Japanese culture encroached upon South Korea, 
these films occupy a unique place in South Korea’s cultural history of the 
Cold War. The realpolitik of the Cold War moment in which these films 
were generated can be discerned, I further contend, in the strained logic of 
their cinematic form, which on the whole is characterized by ideological 
equivocation.
In this essay, however, I propose a rereading of these films as war narra-
tives. To do this, I examine Manchurian action films through the conceptual 
lens of genre while attending to the constitutive problematics of genre- based 
analysis. In examining Manchurian action films as war narratives rather 
than as action films or Westerns, as they are more typically categorized and 
treated in existing scholarship, I argue against narrow preconceptions of 
genres when it comes to cultural narration of the Korean War. By situating 
the Korean War within the broader political economy of the Cold War, 
I aim to show how Manchurian action films complicate the generic tem-
plate and periodized framework of Korean War films. Proceeding from the 
observation that constant war and military mobilization have structured — 
 indeed produced — a false sense of stability and prosperity in the East Asian 
region, I argue that Manchurian action films reflect the material contradic-
tions of South Korea’s Cold War culture.
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Following the Money
Criticism on Manchurian action films has strongly favored the later period 
films at the expense of a close overview of the early works. By “later period,” 
I mean the late 1960s and early 1970s films in which the genre’s hybrid 
features were more pronounced, and its mantra of anti- Japanese national-
ism was more ironically represented. Whereas the early Manchurian action 
films had a strong generic affiliation with war films, the later works began, 
so to speak, to don Western garb. As the critical ascendancy of Break Up 
the Chain (Soesasŏrŭl kkŭnŏra, Yi Man- hŭi, 1971) illustrates, South Korea’s 
Manchurian action films’ generic shift to the Western, the most recogniz-
ably transnational genre of the time, facilitated a reading in which the later 
examples of the genre appear to mark a departure from the dominant state 
ideology. By valorizing the later films over the earlier ones, film critics, per-
haps inadvertently, equated the earlier war narrative of Manchurian action 
films as uncritical repositories of state propaganda. As the logic goes, the 
earlier works show total support for the nation, whereas the later works 
deviate from such political programming. It is only the later works then, 
that is, the generically Western Manchurian action films, that deserve criti-
cal analysis and retrieval.
Although the interpretive valorization of the late Manchurian action 
films turns on the hybrid genre’s subversive potentials, this identification of 
generic diversity with progressive politics misses the thematic axis that gives 
coherence to and regulates the imagining of war in the first place. The ques-
tions I accordingly would like to pose speak to the changing contours of cin-
ematic nationalism, but they also relate directly to how South Korean war 
narratives engage the structuring context of the Cold War. In particular, I 
would like to inquire toward what end male protagonists in war situations, 
specifically, the armed anticolonial struggle, exert their power and strength. 
What are the specific gains and rewards of their actions and endeavors? 
And, how are these actions related to the overarching anticolonial discourse 
of the nation that seems to dominate this war imaginary? The answer to 
these questions is money. By money, I am referring to the way money as well 
as its metaphorical forms and configurations gain structural significance in 
the war imaginary of Manchurian action films.
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Cinematic representations of colonialism prior to the advent of Manchu-
rian action films depict money or wealth in a purely negative fashion — in 
the form, more often than not, of ill- gotten gains. This negative depiction 
of material gains enables a dichotomous mapping of the world in which 
virtuous Koreans are set against treacherous Koreans. Collaborators, for 
instance, are always associated with material enrichment; their wealth is, 
these filmic narratives make clear, the direct outcome of their treachery. The 
binary logic of seeking money or serving the nation dominates the narrative 
of films like Farewell to Tumen River (Tumanganga charikkŏra, Im Kwon- 
t’aek, 1961), an antecedent of Manchurian action films in which Japanese 
monetary reward for Korean collusion is depicted as pure evil — a system of 
colonial collaboration that must be eliminated. The imperative of tracing, 
identifying, and punishing Korean traitors who receive reward money from 
the Japanese while exonerating those who have been wrongfully accused as 
collaborators structures South Korea’s representations of colonialism.
The conception of money changes substantially by the mid- 1960s, how-
ever. In fact, the advent of the Manchurian action film signals a radically 
different conception of money within the anticolonial war imaginary of 
South Korean film. Money is no longer conceived as a sign of corruption 
or betrayal — as something, in other words, at odds with the sacred aura 
of nationalist struggle. Instead, the guerrilla force now needs money des-
perately; specifically, the guerrillas are in dire need of war funds to carry 
out their military campaigns. Films like The Continent on Fire (Pulbutnŭn 
taeryuk, Yi Yong- ho, 1965) and Soviet- Manchurian Border (Soman kukkyŏng, 
Kang Pŏm- gu, 1964) are prime examples of this narrative reconception of 
money. These war narratives identify the procurement, the transfer, and the 
management of war funds as their principal action. In Soviet- Manchurian 
Border, for example, the male protagonist’s prolonged suffering and melan-
cholia derives precisely from his failure to complete business transactions, 
namely, the delivery of war funds, with the Soviet Army. In the wake of 
this failure, burdened by guilt and shame, the protagonist is unable to return 
to the guerrilla headquarters, becoming instead a leader of a local gangster 
organization. Only with his delivery of lost war funds to the guerrilla force 
is this figure morally redeemed by the end of the film.
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The narrative of many early 1960s Manchurian action films is often struc-
tured around the theme of “following the money.” The procurement of the 
war funds by whatever means necessary is featured as central to the struggle 
against the Japanese, so much so that this economic endeavor is virtually 
identical to, rather than inconsistent with, upholding the political mantra of 
nationalism. Here, the political creed and the economic agenda of the South 
Korean state appear to be in total unison. In order to serve the nation, one 
must bring money to the table. Patriotism is accordingly curiously defined in 
terms of purloined property or canny resource procurement. This, I argue, 
is a distinctively capitalist way of imagining the anticolonial struggle par-
ticular to South Korea’s war narrative films.10
It must be noted that war funds never appear as bank notes as such. 
Instead, money appears in the form of objects, properties, or resources with 
monetary value: gold bullion, treasure maps, Buddha statues, jewelry, min-
eral and ore mine maps, and so forth. Strikingly, identifiably Japanese gov-
ernment notes or bank notes — the actual legal tender of Manchukuo as a 
Japanese colony — never appear as circulating currency in Manchurian action 
films. Like Japanese settlers and residents in Korea, who never appear in the 
nationalist imaginary of colonial Korea, Japanese money is structurally absent 
in Manchurian action films, even though the genre is thematically preoc-
cupied — indeed obsessed — with money. Manchurian action films, in other 
words, are largely preoccupied with money — in nonmoney forms — this is to 
say, money unmarked as the legal tender of the Japanese empire. It is not too 
difficult to imagine the practical reasons for this obscurantist way of figuring 
the money.
In the representation of colonialism in Korea, Japanese rule must be ren-
dered precisely as military occupation. Framing the Japanese colonial ruling 
as an unlawful foreign occupation thereby signals the political crisis of the 
temporary loss of the nation. The colonial occupation becomes manage-
able through the resistance politics of armed struggle. However, depicting 
the settlement of Japanese residents and circulation of government notes 
outright would engender a different, less recognizably anticolonial national 
story. The depiction of Japanese settler colonialists and the circulation of 
Japanese yuan (yen) would signify the deep penetration of the Japanese 
colonial power into the economic sphere of Korean people — into arenas 
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of daily activities. Outright depiction of this penetration could mean, then, 
the implication of all Koreans into a system of colonial rule so total that 
the space of resistance would difficult to conceive. Any such signifiers of a 
permanent colonial economy therefore have been omitted from the nation-
alist imaginary. In Manchurian action films, the male characters, whether 
villains, good guys, or nationalist fighters, are in competition, forming alli-
ances or committing betrayal to get the prized objects, which are never 
explicitly Japanese bank notes. Korean nationalists cannot, after all, be seen 
in pursuit of Japanese bank notes — a quest that would signal the totality of 
Japanese hegemony.
Manchurian action films also depict the original ownership of properties 
in intentionally murky terms; these filmic narratives are premised, how-
ever, on the assumption that the guerrilla camp has always had rightful 
ownership. In Return of the Wanderer (Kim Hyo- ch’ŏn, 1970), it is virtually 
impossible to figure out to whom the gold bullion originally belonged. All 
the involved characters dispute the history of gold bullion, but the original 
owner is never verified. Yet, the logical disarray over anterior ownership of 
the property, which inadvertently produces a series of unintended campy 
moments, becomes immediately cleared once the nationalist guerrillas enter 
the picture and declare their ownership claim. This conception of guer-
rilla treasure as the nation’s anterior possession is achieved by portraying 
the nationalist camp as having greater and more precise knowledge of the 
properties’ whereabouts and true value. Although the individual guerrillas 
are often depicted as not fully understanding the true value of the proper-
ties, they acquire such information as they are drawn more deeply into their 
mission. Guided by a higher authority, the desire of the guerrillas in the 
nationalist camp to pursue the property thus appears to be aimed at verify-
ing and restoring the rightful order of things.
Not open to questioning, the authority of the nationalist camp is tied to 
its apparently unchallenged ownership claim to the treasure. This rightful 
lien is matched by the total commitment of the guerrilla agents, who simply 
follow their orders without reservation. Here, the Manchurian action film is 
explicit in its psychoanalytic figuration of the authority of the nation- state. 
Although Korea lost its sovereignty to Japan during the historical period 
described in Manchurian action films, the proto- state nevertheless asserts its 
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authority over its subject through a dyad of two psychoanalytically drawn 
subjects, which complementarily constitute the symbolic order of national-
ism. On the one end of the spectrum is the subject who is supposed to know 
(the leader of the guerrilla camp), and on the other is the subject who is 
supposed to believe (guerrilla agents).11 What sustains the authority of the 
proto- state, as figured by the all- knowing guerrilla leader, is the leader’s 
knowledge of the specific location of the prized object. The leader, in other 
words, always already knows the whereabouts and the value of the proper-
ties; at the same time, the agent unequivocally believes the leader’s knowl-
edge of the properties. This pairing of these two subjects in their shared 
quest for treasure is indispensable to establishing the symbolic order of the 
Korean nation and society. Whereas war could easily signify the breakdown 
of the normal order, war as business, as rendered in Manchurian action film, 
serves to solidify the power and authority of the state.
The amorphous character of war funds, which structure, define, and reg-
ulate militant anticolonial struggle in these early Manchurian action films, 
demands further attention. Their depiction clearly echoes the Marxist notion 
of money as the matrix of social relations. Yet, the peculiarly topological 
aspect of money, devoid of any reference to actually existing Japanese legal 
tender, encourages us to conceive of war funds in these films in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic terms as “objet petit a”: namely, as that which remains perpetu-
ally out of reach but, as a trigger, structures desire, setting it in motion.12 In 
this regard, the proto- state, or the subject who is supposed to know all about 
money, not only commands service to the nation but also tantalizes each indi-
vidual, compelling the guerilla into a cycle of action that never reaches final 
fulfillment. After all, the money that the nationalist guerrilla forces attain 
ultimately belongs to the state. In this sense, Manchurian action films offer a 
portrait of a state, which regulates not solely through the severity of order and 
coercion but, rather, by offering a powerful scenario of desire.
Not only do Manchurian action films compel a reconsideration of the 
South Korean proto- nation by figuring it as an anticolonial guerrilla force 
and of money by depicting it as ill- gotten gains; they also unveil the seamy 
underside of war as a profitable state business. Its authority far from righ-
teous, the nation in these films appears as an underground quasi- criminal 
organization whose main business operations require the liquidation and 
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laundering of stolen goods into money — the conversion, in other words, of 
plunder into legal tender. In their refusal to figure the nation as a transcen-
dental entity whose legitimacy is beyond question, Manchurian action films 
perversely identify war profiteering as the motor of the nation. In so doing, 
South Korea’s Manchurian action films offer the possibility of a new inter-
pretation of the Korean War narrative: set within the colonial period yet 
produced in the decade following the 1950 – 53 conflict, these films expose 
the shadowy — indeed, illegitimate — underside of the nation. Founded on 
ill- gotten gains and perpetuated by the same, the capitalist nation in the 
throes of war makes revealing recourse, in this filmic cycle, to perverse acts 
of criminal violation and transgression.
The radically ambivalent, primitive setting of Manchurian action films 
serves to displace the obscenity of the nation’s self- sustaining activities, in 
effect, by relegating and sequestering it to the arena of fiction. In the Man-
churian action film, the deeply ideological spatial imaginary of the Holly-
wood Western genre has been grafted onto the making of the South Korean 
nation. Unable to lay claim to the historic anticolonial revolutionary legacy 
associated with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in the region, South 
Korea’s Manchurian action films construct a different lineage — one that 
borrows from the settler colonial logic of Manifest Destiny in the United 
States. Indeed, the generic influence of the Western, particularly those films 
that come later in the Manchurian action film cycle, is unmistakable. West-
ern films generally portray the West as empty, chaotic, and violent but ulti-
mately in the process of becoming part of the nation’s sovereign territory. 
Their narrative simultaneously erases local history and turns the space into 
a battleground for competing ownership claims. It is a space, in effect, that 
is up for grabs. Often the outsider who has no clear historical lien on the 
space emerges as the proprietor by virtue of being the victor of a violent con-
testation. South Korea’s Manchurian action films appropriate this generic 
configuration of the West as the open, yet- to- be- claimed space. Borrowing 
its atmosphere of lawlessness from the Western genre, Manchurian action 
films feature Westernized spaces in which the guerrilla camp assumes prior 
ownership of property and resources and legitimizes their endless pursuit 
of the same. Those who know about or discover the valued objects first can 
claim the ownership according to the rationale of “finders keepers.”13
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Yet, here the ethics promulgated by spaghetti Westerns must be distin-
guished from those particular to classical Westerns, which have little to 
do with the former’s explicit emphasis on personal greed and materialism. 
Whereas many classical Western films are preoccupied with the establish-
ment of law and order of a frontier community, the former are not concerned 
with such lofty ideals. Instead, the main characters in spaghetti Westerns 
are focused on individual gains and private material rewards. Manchurian 
action films’ persistent emphasis on resource procurement reflects how the 
narrative logic of individual greed and materialism in the spaghetti West-
ern can be incorporated into the particular capitalist logic of South Korea’s 
cinematic nationalist imaginary.
Manchurian action films thus project a distinctively capitalist way of con-
ceiving anticolonial nationalism and in so doing expose the operations of 
war as a business. Manchurian action films accordingly furnish us with a 
critical opportunity to consider how Cold War bipolar politics and neoliberal 
logic have permeated deeply into South Korea’s anticolonial imagination. 
Here, the nation is represented as a political entity that constantly demands 
individual action to procure money equivalents: namely, objects, properties, 
and resources that can be transformed into operational resources. The anti- 
Japanese guerrilla campaign is thus less about logistical specifics — where to 
fight, how to fight, with whom to fight, with whom to form alliances — than 
it is about how to secure war funds. According to this logic, bringing money 
home is the paramount nationalist act.
Produced during the Cold War, Manchurian action films feature war 
troves comprising sundry material objects, the ambiguity of which, I argue, 
can be read critically against the historical juncture in which these films 
were produced. Uneasily recalling the structural amorphousness of Japanese 
economic assistance so central to South Korea’s economic miracle, the fun-
gibility of funds — and the mystery of their origins — in Manchurian action 
films must be understood, I argue, against South Korea’s historic normal-
ization of relations with Japan in the 1960s. It is no secret that Park Chung 
Hee’s principal reasons in normalizing relations with Japan were economic. 
And, without question, money from Japan in the form of compensation, 
grants, and loans was vital to the early stages of Park’s development project. 
Considering this, I would argue that Manchurian action films’ persistent 
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conjuration of money allegorizes how the secret of South Korea’s financial 
rise remains hidden from view in South Korean society, much as the con-
cept of “enemy properties” in the postliberation period effectively erased 
Japanese capital and properties. The fact that the original ownership of the 
properties is never in question in Manchurian action films is important inso-
far as it reinforces, in legerdemain fashion, South Korea’s social myth of 
autonomous development and industrialization.
I conclude my essay with a question: If the basis of the nation is rep-
resented as war profiteering, what happens when that nation no longer is 
associated with war as a business? Put differently, will the profit- seeking 
individual still fight for and serve the nation when the latter has nothing 
to offer in material terms? Here, it is worth briefly turning to Yi Man- hŭi’s 
1970 Manchurian action film, Break the Chain, in which the decoupling of 
money and politics happens. Many critics valorize the film for its seeming 
resistance to the nationalist call of duty. The film ends with the dispersion 
of its main protagonists, three men who refuse to join the nationalist cam-
paign, yet I would note that their decision comes after they realize that the 
object of their pursuit, the Tibetan Buddhist statue, has no monetary value 
whatsoever; rather, the statue has the names of the guerrilla force inscribed 
inside — identities that must be protected at all cost. In other words, this 
statue is politically important to the guerrilla camp alone. Upon realizing 
the purely political value of the pursued object, these men depart. If Yi Man- 
hŭi’s film is unusual, it is not because their action signifies a willful rejec-
tion of nationalism in its totality. Rather, his film is uncommon because the 
anticolonial struggle is presented without any promise of material reward: it 
has emerged as pure politics. The protagonists leave behind the nationalist 
campaign because it is no longer attractive to them materially. The film’s 
ending then reminds us of the disturbing truth of a state caught in the logic 
of the Cold War: without monetary objects it can offer up to compel action, 
the state is stripped of its authority. The only way to reverse this situation 
is for the nation- state to assume what is expected under Cold War politics: 
namely, to maintain war profiteering as its raison d’être.
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13.  In The Good, the Bad, and the Weird (Choŭnnom nappunnom isanghannom, Kim Jeeun, 2008) 
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